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Stalin in contemporary Russia: admired and required
Katarzyna Chawryło
Despite the fact that more than 60 years have passed since the death of Joseph Stalin, the 
leader of the USSR from 1922 to 1953, the memory of him remains alive. For several years 
running Stalin has topped the ranking of the most remarkable figures in Russia’s history. Por-
traits of him appear at political demonstrations and religious events; new monuments to the 
dictator are erected. The Kremlin’s official rhetoric increasingly refers to the positive aspects 
of the Soviet era, in particular to the victory in World War II. Representatives of the state’s ad-
ministration and the Orthodox Church have been making favourable comments about Stalin. 
However, Stalin’s popularity among society in today’s Russia is rather superficial – Russians 
know little about the dictator and his life; they are rather nostalgic about the period of his 
rule and the achievements of his era. The image of the Soviet dictator as an outstanding 
leader is blended with Russians’ individual memories of repression and terror which affected 
almost every Russian family. These reminiscences however do not penetrate the public sphere 
at the mass level, which makes it possible for the state’s narrative to dominate it. The Krem-
lin has exploited the ambivalent and superficial attitude which Russians have to Stalin. Even 
though it does not glorify him, it allows for his social cult to develop, and contributes to it by 
selectively emphasising the positive aspects of the leader’s actions and by mythologising his 
image. The Kremlin has been legitimising its power based on politics of memory, generating 
controlled divisions in society and mobilising its proponents. On the other hand, the govern-
ment has made it more difficult to draw attention to the murderous nature of Stalin’s actions. 
Any criticism of him (from Russian citizens and civil society organisations as well as the inter-
national community) is seen as an attack on contemporary Russia and its present government 
which presents itself as the heir to the USSR’s and Stalin’s accomplishments and victories.
From de-Stalinisation to re-Stalinisation 
Three years after Joseph Stalin’s death, the first 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khru-
shchev, prepared a secret report ‘On the Cult 
of Personality and Its Consequences’ in which 
he condemned Stalin’s methods of ruling the 
country and partly exposed his murderous ac-
tions. Even though the criticism was rather se-
lective, at that time it caused a shockwave in 
the communist world. Fearing the tumultuous 
implications of the speech in Russian society 
and the international community, Khrushchev 
decided that the speech must not be leaked to 
the press as this would provide arguments to 
Russia’s enemies and expose the country’s we-
akness. Even before it fully began, the process 
of de-Stalinisation had already lost its impetus. 
De-Stalinisation measures undertaken by conse-
cutive USSR leaders were limited. The political 
foundations of the communist system were not 
destroyed, radical reforms were not made – the 
single-party system was preserved for many 
years; this also applied to persecutions on po-
litical grounds and the centralised economy. 
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The furthest-reaching measures aimed at re-
vealing and assessing the legacy of Stalinism 
were taken only after the collapse of the USSR, 
at the beginning of the 1990s, when Boris Yelt-
sin was the Russian president. A section of the 
archives1 were opened, many historical disser-
tations and memories of prisoners from that 
era were published. To some extent it was due 
to the Memorial Society2 which was actively 
operating at that time and thus repression and 
how it is assessed came to be discussed in the 
public sphere. These actions, however, proved 
to be short-lived and in the following years 
the decisions made by Yeltsin were revised3.
After Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, in 
spite of individual gestures made to comme-
morate the victims of Stalinism, such as visits 
to the military training ground in Butovo near 
Moscow where at the time of the Great Pur-
ge thousands of people were shot to death, it 
quickly became clear that a definitive coming 
to terms with the Stalinist past would not be 
made at the government’s initiative. As early as 
towards the end of 2000 the new Russian pre-
sident signalled that he did not intend to assess 
and cut ties with the past when he suggested 
changing the Russian national anthem from the 
‘Patriotic song’ introduced in 1991 to a contem-
porary adaptation of the USSR’s 1944 national 
anthem. In his statements Putin would also call 
Stalin an ‘efficient manager’ and the collapse of 
the USSR ‘the largest geopolitical catastrophe’ 
(for the first time in 2005)4.
The present historical narrative of the Russian 
government increasingly refers to the USSR 
era and Stalin’s rule, selecting positive aspects 
1 Among these documents were the classified files re-
garding the Katyn massacre, the so-called special folder 
no.1, which were handed to the Polish government in 
October 1992. 
2 The Memorial Society was established in 1989. It focuses 
on examining and drawing attention to crimes of total-
itarianism, including Stalinism, and commemorating its 
victims.
3 For example, access to the archives was made more dif-
ficult, the files from the Russian investigation into the 
Katyn massacre were classified.
4 Including the speech in front of the Federal Assembly in 
2005: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Owzbl7Tsg14 
of that time, particularly the victory in World 
War II, which Russians call the Great Patriotic 
War5, and that has become the main pillar of 
Russian national identity. According to experts 
and sociological research, this politics of me-
mory emerged as early as in 20046. It was 
substantially intensified following Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea in 2014 when the Krem-
lin’s propaganda indoctrinated society with 
a militarised, confrontational and imperialistic 
historical narrative. It justified Russia’s rights 
to the peninsula and depicted the revolution 
in Kyiv as the rebirth of ‘fascism’ which Russia 
should once again defeat. The results of public 
opinion surveys indicate that a certain kind of 
re-Stalinisation of social consciousness or even 
a rebirth of the cult of Stalin is underway.
The manifestations of a re-emerging cult 
Building monuments to Stalin or busts and 
commemorative plaques in his name is the 
most spectacular way of commemorating Stalin 
5 This expression was first used by Stalin and is now quite 
popular in Russia since it emphasises the huge scale of 
the war and confers an existential character on the vic-
tory. In line with the Russian narrative, the war lasted 
from mid-1941 to May 1945; it did not however cover 
the period of military and economic co-operation be-
tween the USSR and the Third Reich. 
6 Since Putin came to power, politics of memory regarding 
the Stalinist era has been subordinated to a wider polit-
ical process and used opportunistically and instrumen-
tally for the purposes of the international policy, e.g. for 
the purposes of the short-lived rapprochement with Po-
land, the Russian government made a series of gestures 
condemning Stalin’s policy towards Poland (e.g. Putin 
visited Katyn; during his visit to Westerplatte in Septem-
ber 2009 he condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). 
On the other hand, in 2009 the Presidential Commission 
of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify 
History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests was set up, 
with the aim of defending the vision of historical events 
that the Kremlin wished to present.
The present historical narrative of the 
Russian government increasingly refers 
to the USSR era and Stalin’s rule, select-
ing positive aspects of that time.
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in contemporary Russia. Initiatives of this kind 
have appeared in certain regions of the country, 
including in Moscow, in recent years7. Some of 
the monuments have been erected at the initia-
tive of the Communist Party of the Russian Fe-
deration which funded the monuments to com-
memorate anniversaries related to the history 
of the USSR, e.g. the outbreak of the October 
Revolution, the victory in the Great Patriotic War, 
and the birth of Stalin, whom it considers to be 
a hero. For example, at the 70th anniversary of 
the victory in the Great Patriotic War, comme-
morated in 20158, monuments to Stalin were 
erected in front of the office of the Communist 
party in Lipetsk and Penza9. Certain initiatives are 
promoted by organisations and people affilia-
ted with the Kremlin. In 2015 in Yalta in Crimea, 
which had been annexed by Russia, a monu-
ment to the great triumvirate – Stalin, Churchill 
and Roosevelt – was unveiled to commemorate 
the 70th anniversary of the Yalta conference; the 
celebration was attended by the then Chairman 
of the State Duma, Sergei Naryshkin. A bust of 
Stalin in the Pskov oblast was erected in 2016 
as part of the Stalin Line Museum and funded 
by the Russian Military-Historical Society who-
7 According to the statistics presented on the website 
http://www.great-country.ru/articles/sssr/sov_governor/
stalin/00136.html at present there are 93 monuments 
to Stalin in Russia. This data is difficult to verify. The list 
was published in February 2016, since then the number 
of the monuments might have increased. 
8 Е. Галочка, Памятник Сталину установили в Липецке 
перед 9 мая, Московский комсомолец, 7.05.2015, 
http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/05/07/pamyatnik-stali-
nu-ustanovili-v.html 
9 КПРФ, несмотря на протесты, установила в центре 
Пензы бюст Сталина, Radio Svoboda, 9.09.2015, 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/27235641.html 
se president is the minister of culture Vladimir 
Medinsky10. Busts of USSR-era and post-Soviet 
state officials, including Lenin and Stalin, appe-
ared in Moscow’s Alley of Rulers which was es-
tablished at the initiative of the Russian Military-
-Historical Society (as it was officially unveiled on 
22nd September 2017). The event’s organisers un-
derline that it was not their intention to glorify 
these figures but only to commemorate the coun-
try’s history. However, the fact that the a bust to 
Stalin was built in the capital stirred controversy 
in a section of society.
Monuments are not the only manifestation of 
Stalin’s return to the Russian public sphere. 
Souvenirs with the dictator’s image – T-shirts, 
matryoshkas and postcards – can be bought 
in markets and fairs. It is possible to take 
a photograph with a person dressed up as Sta-
lin in popular tourist spots (e.g. at Red Square 
in Moscow). Thus the USSR leader has becomea 
trade mark which can bring profits. This trend 
is part of a larger phenomenon of  Soviet goods 
and culture being back in fashion which can be 
illustrated by the return of food products with 
the symbolism of the Stalin era to stores, e.g. 
Soviet Standard, Soviet or USSR ice cream11 and 
the huge popularity of Soviet films and songs.
The initiatives to build monuments to Stalin are 
not coordinated by the Russian government; 
the Kremlin’s role is rather limited to giving 
consent to their construction. In certain cases 
the government has blocked local initiatives 
of this type – it did not allow a monument to 
be built or delayed the official decision to al-
locate a certain location for a monument. For 
example, the local government of Novosibirsk 
did not allow a monument to Stalin to be built, 
10 И. Азар, Трепещите, ядом плюйте. Как Иосиф Сталин 
возвращается в жизнь современной России, Meduza, 
25.02.2016, https://meduza.io/feature/2016/02/25/trep 
eschite-yadom-plyuyte 
11 The Soviet ice cream, popularised by the famous USSR 
commissioner Anastas Mikoyan, was regarded as 
a high-quality product made from natural ingredients. 
The fact that producers referred to the past era is a sav-
vy marketing trick based on the sentimental attachment 
present in Russian society.
Monuments are not the only manifesta-
tion of Stalin’s return to the Russian pub-
lic sphere. Souvenirs with the dictator’s 
image are widely available on markets 
and fairs.
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arguing that the initiative caused mixed feelin-
gs among the inhabitants of the town. In 2016 
the municipal authorities removed a newly 
erected monument to Stalin in Surgut at the 
initiative of the inhabitants. Red paint had 
been thrown on the monument a few times12.
Such protests against the construction of mo-
numents to Stalin and other wider civil society 
initiatives to commemorate the victims of the 
repression indicate that a section of Russian so-
ciety decidedly condemn Stalin and his actions. 
It is worth noticing the initiatives undertaken 
by the Memorial Society such as the Restoring 
Names action which is carried out in many tow-
ns and cities and consists in reading names of 
the victims of the Stalin era in public and similar 
actions (most often conducted by opposition 
circles) intended to commemorate particular 
people: the Last Address, the Immortal Barrack. 
An initiative that has consolidated Russians is 
the construction of a monument to the vic-
tims of Stalinist repression in the 1930s under 
the name of the Garden of Memory located in 
a former NKVD training ground in Butovo near 
Moscow that was opened in September 2017. 
The construction was funded from private do-
nations, without the help of the government. 
On the 30th October, in Moscow, on the Day 
of Victims of Political Repression13 the memorial 
to the victims of Stalin’s repression, the Wall of 
Grief, was open in the presence of the highest 
state authorities. The position on Stalinism is 
becoming a cause of divisions in Russian society 
and the Kremlin is making use of it.
12 Сургутский памятник Сталину демонтировали, Len- 
ta.ru, 6.10.2016, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/10/06/stalin 
13 The construction of the memorial was envisaged in the 
presidential decree of 2015.
Opinions about Stalin 
A considerable section of Russian society consi-
ders Stalin to be the greatest figure in Russian 
history. For years he has topped the ranking 
prepared by the public opinion research organi-
sation Levada-Center (in the opinion of 38% of 
those surveyed). Vladimir Putin comes in second 
(with 34%, level with Alexander Pushkin)14. On 
the other hand, there is a growing number of 
Russians who admit they know nothing about 
the Stalinist repression – in 2012 only 6% of the 
respondents declared this, whereas in May 2017 
the number rose to 13%. Every fourth respon-
dent believes the repression was ‘justified by po-
litical necessity’ and 36% of those surveyed think 
that the successes of the Stalinist era achieved in 
such a short time justify the sacrifices made. The 
opinions of Russians regarding the nature of the 
Stalinist repression are also changing dynamical-
ly. The number of those who treat it as a political 
crime has decreased from 67% in 2012 to 39% 
in 201715. Russians are rather against clarifying 
history and punishing those responsible for the 
repression. According to data from 2017, the 
number of Russians who believe the repression 
should be discussed less and that ‘old wounds 
should not be opened’ rose from 37% in 2012 
to 47% in 201716. Interestingly enough, Stalin led 
the ranking conducted by the Russian media in 
2008 in order to choose the greatest hero in Rus-
sian history17. Eventually, it was Alexander Nevsky 
who came in first, which was due to the interven-
tion of the organisers of the ranking, according 
to commentators, who were afraid that victory 
for Stalin would spark too much controversy. 
However, Stalin’s popularity in Russian society is 
rather superficial since people know little about 
him and his life; rather they are nostalgic about 
the period of his rule and the achievements of 
his era (the defeat of Nazism, industrial develop-
14 An open question was asked, for more information see: 
http://www.interfax.ru/russia/568025 
15 https://www.levada.ru/2017/09/07/16561/ 
16 Ibid.
17 С. Бочарова, Земля по имени Сталин, Gazeta.ru, 
7.07.2008, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/07/07 
_a_2776363.shtml 
A significant section of Russian society 
considers Stalin to be the greatest figure 
in Russian history. Every fourth respon-
dent believes the repression was ‘justified 
by political necessity’.
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ment, particular order and discipline in society). 
In the widespread image of Stalin in Russia, he 
is presented as the father of the nation – a strict 
ruler, but wise and he loved the people. This at-
titude to the leader corresponds to the respect 
for rule with a strong hand and the approach 
to the state authorities based on the principle 
that ‘the tsar is good, only the boyars are bad’, 
which is deeply rooted in Russian society. Sta-
lin’s popularity is due to the longing for the 
order of Soviet times and a particular concept 
of justice – as someone on the Internet put it 
– ‘both a worker and a minister were equal be-
fore the law’. This subjective representation of 
the past can be seen particularly in the older 
generation who remember the USSR era and 
think about it with sentimental attachment, to 
a large extent because those were the years of 
their youth. The memory of Stalinist times has 
faded in their minds so that it is often reduced 
to taking pride in the victory in the war. In the 
younger section of Russian society who do not 
remember the Stalinist era, the figure of the le-
ader is associated almost exclusively with the 
USSR’s victory in the Great Patriotic War – per-
ceived as the epic victory which has earned Rus-
sia respect and caused fear in the international 
arena. The promotion of these clichéd opinions 
can be attributed to the Kremlin’s propaganda 
and these perceptions are further perpetuated 
by society’s poor knowledge of history, which is 
revealed in sociological research (e.g. the rese-
arch conducted by Levada-Center on the know-
ledge of the history of the 20th century18).
18 https://www.levada.ru/2017/09/13/16612/ 
It is not a widely held opinion in Russian society 
that the Stalinist regime - and in the broader 
context, communism - was criminal in its es-
sence and similar to fascism (particularly due 
to how it objectified individuals), which is com-
monly condemned. There is no firm conviction 
that Stalin was a tyrant and a person respon-
sible for genocide who should be condemned 
like Hitler because there has never been reflec-
tion on it or a complete (also in legal aspects) 
settlement of accounts with the Soviet past on 
the national level19. The fact that the official 
rhetoric places the emphasis on the victory of 
the USSR in the war and that Stalin is conside-
red to be the main architect of it has made it 
more difficult to rationally assess the past. Due 
to the Kremlin, the myth of the victory, which 
is regarded as the greatest accomplishment of 
the Russian nation, has become the pillar of 
Russia’s contemporary national identity.
The memory of the victory meets the needs of 
Russians since it compensates for the deficit of 
national pride and a sense of community. This 
may be particularly important today because 
reality does not provide reasons for content-
ment (due to low standards of living, widespre-
ad corruption, a lack of upward social mobility 
etc.). In this context, the individual memory of 
Stalinist repression and the period of the Great 
Purge, which brought about individual trage-
dies for nearly every Russian family, fades into 
the background since it causes cognitive disso-
nance and overcomplicates the idealised image 
of the past. Furthermore, many Russians have 
relatives who have participated in the repres-
sion apparatus and this makes them reluctant 
to deal with the past. There is a clear tenden-
cy to justify the repression and to present it as 
a necessary cost, incurred by individuals, in or-
der to accomplish spectacular success for the 
state. This rhetoric falls on fertile ground due 
to the widespread conviction in Russia that the 
19 In 1992 the document was adopted; it placed the blame 
for the crimes of Stalinism on the highest-level manage-
ment of the USSR’s Communist party. Nobody was how-
ever held accountable.  
The myth of the victory, which is regard-
ed as the greatest accomplishment of the 
Russian nation, has become the pillar of 
Russia’s contemporary national identity. 
Stalin is considered to be the main archi-
tect of the victory.
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good of an individual is generally less valued 
than the good of the state. This perception is 
corroborated by cross-cultural research which 
indicates that Russians value individualism less 
than other European nations, whereas they have 
a larger sense of distance towards power and 
a greater awareness of diversified roles in socie-
ty20. On the other hand, the government does 
not allow people to freely express their indivi-
dual memory in the public sphere, thus bloc-
king bottom-up attempts to collectively deal 
with the trauma and to assess the past.
Playing the Stalin cardRussian society’s superfi-
cial assessment of Stalin’s actions has advanta-
ges for the government since it leaves room to 
mythologise and to manipulate social percep-
tions. The Kremlin has been using the politics 
of memory regarding Soviet times (in particu-
lar the victory over fascism) as a fundamental 
instrument of legitimisation of its power and 
control over society, thus ensuring continued 
social support and the preservation of the pre-
sent model of power. The vision of USSR history 
which is promoted by the Kremlin is a series of 
military victories, and scientific and technolo-
gical achievements; the systemic nature of the 
repression is however overlooked since it may 
cause cognitive dissonance or a feeling of guilt 
in society. The conviction that the USSR alone 
defeated the Nazis in 1945, without the help 
of the allies, and saved the European countries 
from ultimate annihilation, is part of this vision 
20 See e.g. the research on values https://geert-hofstede.
com/russia.html 
of history. According to the Kremlin this gives 
Russia a moral right to decide about the fate 
of this part of the world. The question of the 
USSR’s co-operation with Hitler in 1939-1941 
and the aggressive Soviet politics that led to the 
division of Europe, is not mentioned. In the eyes 
of the Kremlin, any attack on Stalin is perceived 
as an assault on contemporary Russia and its 
government. Such an opinion was expressed 
by President Vladimir Putin in a four-episode 
television interview ‘The Putin Interviews’ con-
ducted by filmmaker Oliver Stone. When asked 
about Stalin, Putin declared that the leader was 
a ‘product of his era’ and that the excessive de-
monisation of Stalin is one of the ways to attack 
the USSR and contemporary Russia21. The most 
popular Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda 
wrote that the attitude to Stalin in Russia is 
increasingly positive, despite attempts which 
have been made for over 30 years by the ‘li-
berals’ for Stalin to be regarded as a ‘bloody 
monster and a messenger of hell’22.
It is characteristic that the Kremlin does not 
directly glorify Stalin; it does however selectively 
emphasise positive aspects of the past era and 
somehow allow the cult of Stalin to re-emerge 
in society. This trend is encouraged by the fact 
that attempts to settle accounts with the past 
have been abandoned and the issue of respon-
sibility for the crimes committed has been over-
looked. The historical events have not yet been 
subject to systematic assessment, also from the 
legal point of view, and ‘worked through’ at the 
societal level – the Kremlin is not seeking to do 
so, nor does it allow these processes to develop 
bottom-up, beyond its control. 
This thesis is corroborated by the fact that in 2015 
the Russian government closed the Museum 
of the History of Political Repression Perm-36 
21 Путин в интервью Стоуну рассказал о своем отношении 
к Сталину, Ведомости, 16.06.2017, https://www.vedo-
mosti.ru/politics/news/2017/06/16/694692-putin-rass-
kazal-o-svoem-otnoshenii 
22 А. Гришин, Сталин в России бьет Горбачева влегкую, 
Комсомольская правда, 13.05.2017, https://www.kp.
ru/daily/26678.7/3700700/ 
The Kremlin has been using the politics 
of memory as an instrument of legitimis-
ation of its power and as a tool of control 
over society, thus ensuring continued so-
cial support and the preservation of the 
present model of power.
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– the only museum of the Soviet repression, ho-
used in a former gulag labour camp in Ural. The 
museum was opened due to the effort of the 
Perm branch of the Memorial Society. In 2014 
the organisation was forced to register at the 
Russian Ministry of Justice as a ‘foreign agent’, 
which is meant to discredit its activities in the 
eyes of Russian citizens by evoking associations 
with espionage. Furthermore, particular acti-
vists from the Memorial Society are subject to 
repression at the hands of the Russian state 
administration. The most resonating case in re-
cent months has been that of Yury Dmitriev, an 
activist from the Karelian branch of the Memo-
rial Society, who has been finding sites of mass 
executions and burials of Soviet regime victims 
and listing both the victims and the perpetra-
tors. He has been detained for several months 
and is being tried on charges which are clearly 
fabricated. The advocates defending Dmitriev 
have commented that the persecution is cau-
sed by his activity to reveal names of the execu-
tioners from the Soviet era, among whom  are 
probably the predecessors of those currently in 
power in the region. In 2016 the first verdict 
was issued on the basis of the controversial law 
on the falsification of historical facts related to 
Soviet actions during World War II (referred to 
as the law prohibiting the rehabilitation of Na-
zism23) – a Russian citizen from Perm was sen-
tenced to a high fine for having shared an artic-
le on social media in which it was written that 
the USSR and Germany invaded Poland in 1939 
and provoked World War II24. 
The main instruments which the Russian go-
vernment uses to promote its vision of history 
are propaganda and the education system. The 
state-owned media circulate materials which 
portray Stalin above all as the architect of the 
victory in the Great Patriotic War. The issues of 
the Great Purge, the gulag, the forced collecti-
23 The text of the law adopted in 2014: https://rg.ru/2014/ 
05/07/reabilitacia-dok.html 
24 For more information, see https://www.svoboda.org/a 
/28191755.html 
visation of farming, deportations and famines 
are not brought into the spotlight. The mass-
-produced series in which Stalin is one of the 
main heroes and which are broadcast by Russian 
state-owned television ingrain on a mass level 
a ‘humanised’ picture of Stalin in the minds of 
Russians (e.g. the series ‘Vlasik. Stalin’s shadow’ 
about Stalin’s loyal bodyguard has enjoyed huge 
popularity25). The government also uses the edu-
cation system to perpetuate its desired selective 
vision of history – in history textbooks, which are 
often modelled on those from Stalinist times, 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the Katyn mas-
sacre are not mentioned26, nor is the joint offi-
cial march of the Nazi and Soviet armies in Brest. 
Furthermore, the Russian Orthodox Church is 
becoming an instrument in the hands of the go-
vernment since the Church hierarchs sometimes 
present Stalin’s actions with relativism when di-
scussing history. For instance, the Primate of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch of Moscow 
and all Rus’ Kirill has declared that Stalin is owed 
respect and that the leader’s criminal activity 
should not eclipse the successes of the Soviet 
era27. The Patriarch has expressed this opinion 
even though the Russian Orthodox Church in-
curred colossal losses during the totalitarian re-
pression – many churchgoers and priests were 
killed; 300 of them were shot dead at the NKVD 
25 Other TV series about Stalin are the following: ‘To kill 
Stalin’ (Убить Сталина) from 2013, ‘Comrade Stalin’ 
(Товарищ Сталин) from 2011.
26 This is indicated for example by A. Kolesnikov: https://www.
vedomosti.ru/opinion/columns/2017/09/13/733518-spetsi-
alnaya-istoriya-literatura 
27 Патриарх Кирилл: злодейства не исключали успехов 
советской власти, Radio Svoboda,  4.11.2015, https://
www.svoboda.org/a/27345123.html 
In Russian society and political elite there 
is a widespread reluctance to ‘open the 
old wounds’ of the past, which would lead 
to holding the guilty and the perpetrators 
of the Stalinist crimes accountable.
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training ground in Butovo near Moscow and 
then recognised as saints (new martyrs)28.
Conclusion 
Monuments to Stalin will cease to be built in 
Russia when it becomes clear in the social con-
sciousness that the Soviet regime was as crimi-
nal as the Nazi one. This will be possible only 
if the action carried out by Stalin and his aides 
are fully examined and assessed from the legal 
point of view. 
However, no large-scale need to settle acco-
unts with the past and to reveal the entire truth 
about the Stalinist system, and more widely the 
communist system, can be observed in society. 
There is a widespread reluctance to ‘open the 
old wounds’ of the past, which would lead to 
holding the guilty and the perpetrators of the 
Stalinist crimes accountable. However, bearing in 
mind that the present political system and the 
present model of relations between the Kremlin 
and society is based on control and dependence, 
the chances are low that a de-Stalinisation – and 
more broadly decommunisation – will be carried 
out under pressure from Russian citizens. 
It should not be expected that the government 
will pursue a policy of de-Stalinisation at its 
own initiative in the immediate future – the 
fact that it uses a selectively developed vision 
28 К. Каледа, Бутовский полигон – Русская Голгофа: 
правда и ложь, Pravmir.ru, 9.05.2012, http://www.
pravmir.ru/butovskij-poligon-russkaya-golgofa/ 
of history brings too many advantages both in-
ternally and in the international arena. In a way 
the Kremlin has become hostage to its own po-
litics of memory. Firstly, it tries to come across 
as continuing the achievements and victories of 
Soviet times, which leads to it objecting to the 
criticism of Stalin and his aides. Secondly, the 
present state administration is the direct heir 
to the Soviet institutions which pursued the 
policy of terror (e.g. the NKVD – KGB – FSB); 
no anti-communist vetting of state officials has 
ever taken place. The systemic introduction of 
this process may affect the image of these in-
stitutions and undermine the stability of the 
political system in Russia. Archives in Russia re-
mains closed and the government is rationing 
the disclosure of files, usually declassifying new 
materials in the context of ongoing political ga-
mes in the international arena29. The settling of 
accounts with the past would deprive the Rus-
sian government of an effective instrument of 
international politics. Furthermore, a definitive 
condemnation of Stalin’s actions and the ap-
paratus he created is also met with resistance 
from high-ranking state officials whose parents 
and grandparents followed out Stalin’s orders. 
As the attack on Yury Dmitriev proves, their 
opposition to the attempts at ‘opening old wo-
unds’ may take active forms and be accepted 
by the highest level of the state administration. 
29 Single, carefully selected documents from Soviet times 
were declassified in response to the adoption of the de-
communisation law in Poland. They are available online: 
http://poland1944.mil.ru/ 
